Scope of Police Power of the State

It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection clause.

Inchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil 115

Alias Warrant of Arrest

An alias warrant is issued by a court when the original warrant is returned in 10 days without being served. Insofar as the validity of the warrant of arrest is concerned, the same is valid until served or recalled.

People of the Philippines vs. Cesar Givera

G.R. No. 132159, January 18, 2001

Difference of Rule 45 and Rule 65

"A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is an ordinary appeal. It is a continuation of the case from the CA, Sandiganbayan, RTC, or other courts. This petition must only raise questions of law which must be distinctly set forth and discussed.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original action. It seeks to correct errors of jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one in which the act complained of was issued by the court, officer, or quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction. The purpose of this remedy is to annul void proceedings; prevent unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority; and provide for a fair and orderly administration of justice."

ARBA vs. Nicolas
G.R. No. 168394, October 6, 2008

Case Digest: Vda. de Albar vs. Fabie 106 Phil 855

Facts:

Deceased Dona Rosario Fabie y Grey bequeathed the naked ownership of a parcel of land, the building and other improvements to petitioners and the usufruct to respondent for life. Since the improvements were destroyed during the battle for liberation of Manila City, the Philippine War Damage Commission paid petitioners a sum of money. The real estate taxes due on the land was however paid by respondent from 1945-1954. In 1952, petitioners commenced a civil case to limits respondent's usufruct to the legal interest on the value of the land. Decisions of the lower courts as affirmed by the Supreme Court grants the respondent 6% of the amount received from the Philippine War Damage Commission. Acting from such decision, respondent filed a motion praying for 6% payment for war damage with legal interest per annum. The petitioners opposed claiming that due to respondent's failure to pay the real estate taxes, the property was declared delinquent and sold at public auction which was consequently repurchased by petitioners and that respondent’s usufruct over the property is extinguished.

Issue:

Whether or not the order July 2 and August 25, 1960 issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila modify the Supreme Court decision in G.R. No. L-13361, as modified by SC resolution of February 10, 1960.

Ruling:

The answer must be in the negative. The general rule is that a decision, once executory, is beyond amendment. However, a stay of execution of a final judgment may be authorized if necessary to accomplish the aims of justice, as for instance, where there has been a change in the situation of the parties which makes such execution inequitable.  Thus, the writ prayed for by respondent is denied.

Case Digest: Baluran vs. Navarro 79 SCRA 809

Facts:

Spouses Domingo Paraiso and Fidela Q. Paraiso entered into an agreement entitled "Barter" to "barter and exchange" their residential lot with the unirrigated riceland of spouses Avelino and Benilda Baluran with the following conditions: 1) both parties shall enjoy material possession, 2) the spouses Baluran shall return the lot with damages to be incurred should any children of Natividad P. Obencio, daughter of spouses Paraiso, choose to reside in the municipality and build his own house therein, 3) neither party shall encumber, alienate or dispose the property without consent of the owner. In 1975 Antonio Obendencio filed a complaint to recover the residential lot from spouses Baluran claiming to be the rightful owner after Natividad Paraiso Obedencio donated the land in his favor.

Issues:

1) Whether or not the “Barter Agreement” transferred ownership of the residential lot to petitioner Baluran, and 2) whether or not the right to re-barter or re-exchange of respondent Antonio Obedencio had been barred by the statute of limitation

Ruling:

The title of the agreement is not controlling since the stipulations of the contract indicate that the intentions of the parties is not to transfer ownership of respective properties but only the material possession. What was constituted was a usufruct and not barter, which was extinguished by the happening of the resolutory condition, which is when any of the children of Natividad Obedencio shall choose to build his house on the residential lot, it must be consequently returned. Thus, the parties are entitled to a return of their respective property.

Case Digest: Heirs of Victorino Sarili v. Pedro Lagrosa G.R. No. 193517 January 15, 2014

Facts:

Respondent Pedro Lagrosa is the owner of a parcel of land situated in Caloocan City. He resided in California, USA and during a vacation in the Philippines found that a new certificate of title was issued by the RD in the name of Victorino Sarili by virtue of an alleged falsified document by Sps. Sarili and the RD. Sps. Sarili maintained that they are innocent buyers for value having purchased the property from Ramon B. Rodriguez who possessed and presented a Special Power of Attorney to sell/dispose the property.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a valid conveyance of the subject property to Sps. Sarili.

Ruling:

Since the notarization of the Special Power of Attorney was defective, the sale between Victorino and Ramon is void. Accordingly, the land title in the name of Victorino married to Isabel should be annulled and the name of respondent be reinstated. As to the house built by Sps. Sarili on the land, since he was aware of the palpable irregularity in the Special Power of Attorney and that the person he was dealing with was possibly not authorized, he is considered a builder in bad faith.

Case Digest: Villasi vs. Garcia G.R. No. 190106 January 15, 2014

Facts:

Magdalena Villasi won in a case against Fil-Garcia Construction, Inc. (FGCI). A Writ of Execution having been issued in favor of Villasi, the sheriff levied on a building which was built on a lot registered in the names of spouses Filomeno Garcia and Ermelinda Halili-Garcia. The Spouses Garcia filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim and a Motion to Set Aside Notice of Sale on Execution, claiming ownership of the land and the building which they merely contracted with FGCI to construct and which was mistakenly assessed by the City Assessor in the name of FGCI. The RTC then issued an Order directing the Sheriff to hold in abeyance the conduct of the sale on execution.

Issue:

Whether or not the Sale on Execution of the buildings levied upon must be suspended and held in abeyance on the basis of the respondents' affidavit of third-party claim.

Ruling:

The Court ruled that Spouses Garcia failed to present sufficient evidence proving ownership of the building named under FGCI. The doctrine that accessory follows the principal is inapplicable in this case “where there is a clear and convincing evidence to prove that the principal and the accessory are not owned by one and the same person or entity”. Thus, the Court directed the Deputy Sheriff to proceed with the conduct of the sale on execution of the levied building in favour of Villasi.

Case Digest: Communities Cagayan, Inc. vs. Nanol G.R. No. 176791 November 14, 2012

Facts:

A Contract of Sell was entered into between respondent-spouses and petitioner Communities Cagayan, Inc. whereby the latter agreed to sell to respondent-spouses a house and lot. Accordingly, titles were transferred in the names of respondent-spouses to facilitate loan processing with Capitol Development Bank. The bank collapsed and closed before it could not release the loan thus respondent-spouses availed of the petitioner's in-house financing payable from 1997-2001. In 2000, respondent Arsenio demolished the original house and constructed a three-story house. He died in 2001 leaving his wife to pay for the monthly amortizations. On July 2005, petitioner fined a Complaint for Cancellation of Title, Recovery of Possession, Reconveyance and Damages. In December 2006, the RTC ruled declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale invalid and ordered the petitioner to pay the respondent-spouses their total monthly instalments and the value of the new house minus the cost of the original house.

Issues:

1) Whether petitioner is obliged to refund to respondent-spouses all the monthly installments paid; and

2) Whether petitioner is obliged to reimburse respondent-spouses the value of the new house minus the cost of the original house.

Ruling:

Applying Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 6552 otherwise known as Maceda Law, the Court ruled that respondent-spouses are entitled to the cash surrender value of the payments on the property equivalent to 50% of the total payments made. In addition, applying Article 448 of the Civil Code, the Court ruled that respondent-spouses being considered builders in good faith are entitled to reimbursement of the improvements made on the property.

Case Digest: Republic of the Philippines vs. Arcadio Santos III et.al. G.R. No. 160453 November 12, 2012

Facts:

Petitioners applied for the registration of a lot by the Parañaque River which they allegedly co-owned through continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years. The City of Parañaque (the City) opposed the application for land registration as it needed the property for its flood control program; that the property was within the legal easement of 20 meters from the river bank; and that assuming that the property was not covered by the legal easement, title to the property could not be registered in favor of the applicants for the reason that the property was an orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion.

Issues:

1) Whether or not Art. 457 “To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters” is applicable; and 2) Whether or not respondents could claim the property by virtue of acquisitive prescription pursuant to Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) if the land was formed through the drying up of the river.

Ruling:  

The application by both lower courts of Article 457 of the Civil Code was erroneous because the evidence did not establish accretion, but instead the drying up of the Parañaque River. The deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers. These elements did not concur in this case because the land was caused by the drying up of the river which became an orchard. Thus, Article 457 which provides for accretion is inapplicable. Hence, the dried up river remains owned by the State as part of its public dominion which consequently cannot be claimed by virtue of acquisitive prescription without it being declared alienable and disposable land.

Case Digest: Sitchon et.al. vs. Aquino G.R. No. L-8191 I February 27, 1956

FACTS:

Six class suits were instituted against the City Engineer of Manila to enjoin him from carrying out his threat to demolish the houses of petitioners upon the ground that said houses constitute public nuisances. In due course, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered separate, but substantially identical, decisions adverse to the petitioners, who have appealed therefrom directly to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners' houses are nuisance and should be demolished.

DECISION:

The petitioners’ houses constructed without government authority on public streets constitutes a nuisance which justifies the demolition. Section 31 of Republic Act No. 409, the Revised Charter of the City of Manila grants the city engineer such powers that include demolition of building considered as nuisance to the public. Moreover, Section 1122 of the Revised Ordinance of the City of Manila (No. 1600) explicitly authorizes the action sought to be taken by respondent herein, by providing: “Whenever the owner or person responsible for any unauthorized obstruction shall, after official notice from the proper department, refuse or neglect to remove the same within a reasonable time, such obstruction shall be deemed a public nuisance, and the city engineer is authorized to remove the same at the owner’s expense.”

Case Digest: Velasco vs. Manila Electric Co. G.R. No. L-18390 I August 6, 1971

FACTS:

In 1948, appellant Velasco bought from the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation three (3) adjoining lots situated at the corner of South D and South 6 Streets, Diliman, Quezon City. These lots are within an area zoned out as a "first residence" district by the City Council of Quezon City. Subsequently, the appellant sold two (2) lots to the Meralco, but retained the third lot, which was farthest from the street-corner, whereon he built his house.

In September, 1953, the appellee company started the construction of the sub-station in question. The facility reduces high voltage electricity to a current suitable for distribution to the company's consumers, numbering not less than 8,500 residential homes, over 300 commercial establishments and about 30 industries. The substation has a rated capacity of "2 transformers at 5000 Kva each or a total of 10,000 Kva without fan cooling; or 6250 Kva each or a total of 12,500 Kva with fan cooling". It was constructed at a distance of 10 to 20 meters from the appellant's house. The company built a stone and cement wall at the sides along the streets but along the side adjoining the appellant's property it put up a sawale wall but later changed it to an interlink wire fence. It is undisputed that a sound unceasingly emanates from the substation.

Plaintiff-appellant Velasco contends that the sound constitutes an actionable nuisance because subjection to the sound since 1954 had disturbed the concentration and sleep of said appellant, and impaired his health and lowered the value of his property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the sound emanating from Meralco's substation constitutes an actionable nuisance.

DECISION:

The noise continuously emitted from Meralco’s substation constitutes an actionable nuisance. The Court held that commercial and industrial activities which are lawful in themselves may become nuisances if they are so offensive to the senses that they render the enjoyment of life and property uncomfortable. It is no defense that skill and care have been exercised and the most improved methods and appliances employed to prevent such result. The determining factor when noise alone is the cause of complaint is not its intensity or volume. It is that the noise is of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities, rendering adjacent property less comfortable and valuable. Quantitative measurements obtained through samplings of the sound intensity reveal that indeed the noise continuously emitted, day and night, constitutes an actionable nuisance for which the appellant is entitled to relief, by requiring the appellee company to adopt the necessary measures to deaden or reduce the sound at the plaintiff's house, by replacing the interlink wire fence with a partition made of sound absorbent material, since the relocation of the substation is manifestly impracticable and would be prejudicial to the customers of the Electric Company who are being serviced from the substation.

Case Digest: Ilo-ilo Cold Storage Co. vs. Municipal Council G.R. No. L-7012 I March 26, 1913

FACTS:

The plaintiff, upon authority granted by the defendant, constructed an ice and cold storage plant in the city of Iloilo. Sometime after the plant had been completed and was in operation, nearby residents made complaints to the defendant that the smoke from the plant was very injurious to their health and comfort. Thereupon the defendant appointed a committee to investigate and report upon the matters contained in said complaints. The committee reported that the complaints were well-founded. In a resolution, the plaintiff was given one month to proceed with the elevation of said smokestacks, and if not done, the municipal president will execute the order requiring the closing or suspension of operations of the establishment.

Upon receipt of this resolution and order, the plaintiff commenced this action in the Court of First Instance to enjoin the defendant from carrying into effect the said resolution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Municipal Council has the power to declare the plant of the petitioner a nuisance.

DECISION:

The Municipal Council does not have the power to declare the plant of the petitioner a nuisance because the determination of a nuisance can be decided by the court alone. Municipal councils have the power to declare and abate nuisances, but it is equally clear that they do not have the power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can they authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation, or use is not such. These things must be determined in the ordinary courts of law. In the present case it is certain that the ice factory of the plaintiff is not a nuisance per se. It is a legitimate industry, beneficial to the people, and conducive to their health and comfort. If it be in fact a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of the board. The petitioner is entitled to a fair and impartial hearing before a judicial tribunal.

Case Digest: Hidalgo Enterprises Inc. vs. Balandan et. al. G.R. No. L-3422 I June 13, 1952

FACTS:

Petitioner Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. "was the owner of an ice-plant factory in the City of San Pablo, Laguna, in whose premises were installed two tanks full of water, nine feet deep, for cooling purposes of its engine. While the factory compound was surrounded with fence, the tanks themselves were not provided with any kind of fence or top covers. The edges of the tanks were barely a foot high from the surface of the ground. Through the wide gate entrance, which is continually open, motor vehicles hauling ice and persons buying said commodity passed, and anyone could easily enter the said factory, as he pleased. There was no guard assigned on the gate. At about noon of April 16, 1948, plaintiff's son, Mario Balandan, a boy barely 8 years old, while playing with and in company of other boys of his age entered the factory premises through the gate, to take a bath in one of said tanks; and while thus bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished out later, already a cadaver, having been died of "asphyxia secondary to drowning."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner's tanks are attractive nuisance.

DECISION:

The tanks are not attractive nuisance, thus petitioner Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. is absolved from liability. The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location. Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking in their waters is always the danger of drowning. Against this danger children are early instructed so that they are sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property creates an artificial pool on his own property, merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any new danger . . . (he) is not liable because of having created an "attractive nuisance."

Case Digest: Tamin vs. CA G.R. No. 97477 I May 8, 1992

FACTS:

The plaintiff (petitioner municipality herein) is the owner of a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur with an area of 5,894 square meters more or less; that the parcel of land was reserved for public plaza under Presidential Proclamation No. 365 dated March 15, 1968; that during the incumbency of the late Mayor Isidoro E. Real, Sr. or in 1958, the municipality leased an Area of 1,350 square meters to the defendants (respondents herein) subject to the condition that they should vacate the place in case it is needed for public purposes; that the defendants religiously paid the rentals until 1967; that thereafter, the defendants refused to pay the rentals; that the incumbent mayor discovered that the defendants filed a "Cadastral Answer" over said lot; that the defendants refused to vacate the place despite efforts of the municipality; that the national government had alloted an appropriation for the construction of a municipal gymnasium within the public plaza but the said construction which was already started could not continue because of the presence of the buildings constructed by the defendants; that the appropriation for the construction of the gymnasium might be reverted back to the national government which would result to "irreparable damage, injury and prejudice" to the municipality and its people who are expected to derive benefit from the accomplishment of the project.

The trial court granted the petitioner municipality's motion for a writ of possession "with the ancillary writ of demolition to place in possession the plaintiff on the land subject of this case, to the end that the public construction thereon will not be jeopardized."

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the issuance of the writ of possession and ancillary writ of demolition was proper; and (2) Whether or not the buildings constructed by the respondents are nuisance.

DECISION:

The issuance of the writ of possession and ancillary writ of demolition was improper because an administrative case on the ownership of the land to which the respondent is a party-in-interest is still pending. Thus, should the respondent be declared the rightful owner of the land, the demolition shall be prejudicial to his interest.

The buildings constructed by the respondents shall be considered a nuisance should the pending administrative case declare that the subject land is part of public dominion. The Civil Code provides under Art. 694 that “A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property or anything else which... (5) Hinders or impairs the use of property." Thus, if the administrative case is decided against the respondent, his continued use of the buildings hinders or impairs the use of the property by the municipality making such building a nuisance.

Case Digest: CID vs. Javier G.R. No. L-14116 I June 30, 1960

FACTS:

The plaintiffs' lot (dominant) as well as defendant's lot (servient) are covered by Original Certificates of Title. Certified copies of these certificates of title are found as Annexes "A" and "B", pages 77 to 80 inclusive of the Record on Appeal. In both of them, it does not appear any annotation in respect to the easement supposedly acquired by prescription which, counting the twenty (20) years from 1913 or 1914, would have already ripened by 1937, date of the decrees of registration. Consequently, even conceding arguendo that such an easement has been acquired, it had been cut off or extinguished by the registration of the servient estate under the Torrens System without the easement being annotated on the corresponding certificate of title, pursuant to Section 39 of the Land Registration Act.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondents had acquired by prescription an enforceable easement of light and view arising from a verbal prohibition to obstruct such view and light, alleged to have been made upon petitioner's predecessor-in-interest as owner of the adjoining lot, both of which lots being covered by Torrens titles.

DECISION:

Respondents had not acquired an enforceable easement of light and view by prescription. The windows in question are admittedly in respondents' own building erected on their own lot. The easement, if there is any, is therefore a negative one. It being a negative easement, prescription shall commence to run "from the day on which the owner of the dominant estate has, by a formal act, forbidden the owner of the servient estate to perform any act which would be lawful without the easement." Since no formal act has been done and such easement not having been annotated on the land title, no easement of light and view has been acquired by prescription.

Case Digest: Gargantos vs. Tan Yanon G.R. No. L-14652 I June 30, 1960

FACTS:

In 1927 Tan Yanon purchased a parcel of land with a house of strong materials. This house has on its northeastern side, doors and windows over-looking the parcel of land acquired by Juan Gargantos, herein petitioner, together with the camarin and small building thereon.

In May 1955 Gargantos asked the Municipal Council of Romblon for a permit to construct a combined residential house and warehouse on his lot. Tan Yanon opposed approval of this application. Tan Yanon filed against Gargantos an action to restrain him from constructing a building that would prevent plaintiff from receiving light and enjoying the view through the window of his house, unless such building is erected at a distance of not less than three meters from the boundary line between the lots of plaintiff and defendant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property of respondent Tan Yanon has an easement of light and view against the property of petitioner Gargantos.

DECISION:

Respondent Tan Yanon's property has an easement of light and view against petitioner's property. The two estates, that now owned by petitioner, and that owned by respondent, were formerly owned by just one person, Francisco Sanz. It was Sanz who introduced improvements on both properties. On that portion presently belonging to respondent, he constructed a house in such a way that the northeastern side thereof extends to the wall of the camarin on the portion now belonging to petitioner. On said northeastern side of the house, there are windows and doors which serve as passages for light and view. These windows and doors were in existence when respondent purchased the house and lot from Sanz. The deed sale did not provide that the easement of light and view would not be established. This then is precisely the case covered by Article 624 of the New Civil Code which provides that the existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established by the proprietor of both, shall be considered, if one of them is alienated, as a title so that the easement will continue actively and passively, unless at the time the ownership of the two estate is divided, the contrary is stated in the deed of alienation of either of them, or the sign is made to disappear before the instrument is executed. The existence of the doors and windows on the northeastern side of the aforementioned house, is equivalent to a title, for the visible and permanent sign of an easement is the title that characterizes its existence. Thus, by reason of his easement petitioner cannot construct on his land any building unless he erects it at a distance of not less than three meters from the boundary line separating the two estates.

Case Digest: Purugganan vs. Paredes G.R. No. L-23818 I January 21, 1976

FACTS:

Plaintiff-appellee Emilio Purugganan is the owner of a piece of a residential lot subdivided as Lot 1 and Lot 2, adjacent to and bounded on the North by the lot of defendant-appellant Felisa Paredes. The lots of Purugganan are subject to an easement of drainage in favor of Paredes fully quoted in the Decree of Registration.

In or about the month of March 1951, the defendants-appellants constructed a house on their lot adjacent to Lots 1 and 2 of plaintiff-appellee in such a manner that the southern side of their house is exactly on the brick wall, the southern side of which is the demarcation line between the plaintiff-appellee and the defendants-appellants, demolishing said brick wall and built thereon the southern wall of their house with 3 windows. The house constructed by the defendants-appellants is 2-½ meters longer than the length of roofing allowed in the abovequoted Decree of Registration, and has an outer roofing (eaves) of 1.20 meters, protruding over the property of the plaintiff-appellee which is .20 meters wider than that allowed in the same Decree of Registration, and the rain water from the GI roofing falls about 3 meters inside Lots 1 and 2 of the plaintiff-appellee. The defendants-appellants also placed 3 windows each on the first and second floors of their house on the side facing Lots 1 and 2 of plaintiff-appellee. From the time the defendants-appellants started to construct their house, the plaintiff-appellee has repeatedly and continuously been demanding from the defendants-appellants that the construction of their house be in accordance with the easement, but the defendants-appellants refused to observe the easement and to close their windows. They also prohibited the plaintiff-appellee from constructing a party wall between points 1 and 2 of Lot 2 and between points 2 and 3 and 4 of Lot 1.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not an easement of drainage exist in favour of plaintiff-appellee; and (2) Whether or not defendants-appellants had acquired easement of light and view by prescription through user since time immemorial.

DECISION:

The plaintiff-appellee is entitled to an easement of drainage as annotated on the Certificate of Title. Thus defendant-appellant should reconstruct its roofs and eaves of their house such that the falling water shall not fall on curve into the lots of the plaintiff beyond one meter from the boundary line and by 8-½ meters in length and to remove the said protruding eaves and roof.

No easement of light and view was acquired by defendant-appellants by prescription. Indeed if defendants-appellants had acquired the said easement of light and view by prescription through user since time immemorial why did they not intervene in the registration proceedings for the inclusion of said easement in the Certificate of Title of plaintiff-appellee as an encumbrance thereon, in the same manner that the easement of drainage was annotated in the Certificate of Title of plaintiff-appellee? The easement of drainage was inscribed in the Certificate of Title of plaintiff-appellee in their favor by virtue of an amicable settlement resulting from their opposition to the registration of plaintiff-appellee's property. In this light, their defense of user "since time immemorial" becomes flimsy and is merely being used to simulate a factual issue.

Case Digest: Alolina vs. Flores G.R. No. 198774 I April 04, 2016

FACTS:

Alolino is the registered owner of two (2) contiguous parcels of land. Alolino initially constructed a bungalow-type house on the property. In 1980, he added a second floor to the structure. He also extended his two-storey house up to the edge of his property. There are terraces on both floors. There are also six (6) windows on the perimeter wall: three (3) on the ground floor and another three (3) on the second floor.

In 1994, the respondent spouses Fortunato and Anastacia (Marie) Flores constructed their house/sari sari store on the vacant municipal/barrio road immediately adjoining the rear perimeter wall of Alolino's house. The structure is only about two (2) to three (3) inches away from the back of Alolino's house, covering five windows and the exit door. The respondents' construction deprived Alolino of the light and ventilation he had previously enjoyed and prevented his ingress and egress to the municipal road through the rear door of his house.

Respondents on their part argued that they had occupied their lot where they constructed their house in 1955, long before the plaintiff purchased his lot in the 70s. They further alleged that plaintiff only has himself to blame because he constructed his house up to the very boundary of his lot without observing the required setback. Finally, they emphasized that the wall of their house facing Alolino's does not violate the latter's alleged easement of light and view because it has no window.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not Alolino has acquired easement of light and view; and (2) whether or not Alolino has acquired an easement of right of way.

DECISION:

Alolino does not have an easement of light and view or an easement of right of way over the respondents' property or the barrio road it stands on. Articles 649-657 governs legal easements of right of way. None of these provisions are applicable to Alolino's property with respect to the barrio road where the respondents' house stands on.

On the other hand, an easement of light and view can be acquired through prescription counting from the time when the owner of the dominant estate formally prohibits the adjoining lot owner from blocking the view of a window located within the dominant estate. Notably, Alolino had not made (and could not have made) a formal prohibition upon the respondents prior to their construction in 1994; Alolino could not have acquired an easement of light and view through prescription.

Case Digest: Salazar vs. Gutierrez et. al. G.R. No. L-21727 I May 29, 1970

FACTS:

Crispina Salazar is owner of a piece of land bounded on the northeast by Lot 361, on the southeast by Sapang Tuyo, on the southwest by Lot 435, and on the northwest by Lot 433. Ownership of Lot 433 passed to respondent Guillermo Gutierrez by inheritance in 1927, and Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in his name on June 11, 1928. No annotation of any lien or encumbrance affecting the land appears on either title.

Before the present controversy arose, Lot 436 and some of the surrounding estates, including Lot 433, were irrigated with water from Sapang Tuyo, a public stream, flowing through a dike that traversed Lots 431, 434, 433 and 461. The portion of this dike that passed through Lot 433 branched near the boundary between this lot and Lot 434 into a canal which has been existing for more than 30 years and ran across the rest of Lot 433 up to Lot 436. It was with the water flowing through this canal that Lot 436 used to be irrigated.

On February 24, 1953 respondent Damaso Mendoza, a lessee of Lot 433, demolished the said canal, thereby stopping the flow of the water and depriving Crispina Salazar's Lot 436 of the irrigation facilities which it had formerly enjoyed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an easement of aqueduct exist in favour of Salazar.

DECISION:

Salazar is entitled to an easement of aqueduct. It is a reasonable conclusion from the foregoing that the demolished canal supplying water to Lot 436 of the petitioner was merely extension of the system of conduits established long ago, considering that in view of the topography of the area and the proximity of the said lot to the main dike in Lot 433 it was more convenient to make the connection therewith than to draw water directly from Sapang Tuyo. Article 118 of the Spanish Law of Waters allows the creation of a compulsory easement of aqueduct for the purpose of establishing or extending an irrigation system, and there is nothing to the contrary in the Civil Code.

Case Digest: Valisno vs. Adriano G.R. No. L-37409 I May 23, 1988

FACTS:

THe plaintiff is the absolute owner and actual possessor of a 557,949-square-meter parcel of land. The plaintiff-appellant Valisno bought the land from the defendant-appellees' sister, Honorata Adriano Francisco. The land which is planted with watermelon, peanuts, corn, tobacco, and other vegetables adjoins that of the appellee Felipe Adriano on the bank of the Pampanga River. At the time of the sale of the land to Valisno, the land was irrigated by water from the Pampanga River through a canal about seventy (70) meters long, traversing the appellee's land.

On December 16, 1959, the appellee levelled a portion of the irrigation canal so that the appellant was deprived of the irrigation water and prevented from cultivating his 57-hectare land.

ISSUE:

Whether or not plaintiff-appellant Valisno is entitled to an easement of aqueduct.

DECISION:

Plaintiff-appellant is entitled to an easement of aqueduct and must be granted continued and unimpeded use of the irrigation ditch traversing his land in order to obtain water from the Pampanga River to irrigate appellant's land. The deed of sale in favor of Valisno included the "conveyance and transfer of the water rights and improvements" appurtenant to Honorata Adriano's property. Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the conveyance. As an easement of waters in favor of the appellant has been established, he is entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction, disturbance or wrongful interference such as the appellee's act of levelling the irrigation canal to deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River.

Case Digest: Lizares et. al. vs. Hon. Kintanar et. al. G.R. Nos. L-33868-76 I October 18, 1990

FACTS:

Private respondent Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. (Central) is the owner and operator of a sugar mill located in the Municipality of Talisay, Negros Occidental, manufacturing centrifugal sugar from sugarcanes delivered to the mill by petitioners pursuant to Identical milling contracts executed between the former and the latter. Under the provisions of the milling contracts, Central was granted, inter alia, an easement of aqueduct on the parcels of land owned by petitioners for the passage of water from the Imbang River to its sugar mill. For this purpose, Central constructed concrete water canals traversing the parcels of land of petitioners. The easement of aqueduct was for a period of fifty (50) years, which began with 1920-21 crop year up to 1969-70 crop year. Prior to the expiration of this period, Central, by means of separate letters, offered to lease from petitioners the areas occupied by the canals. However, petitioners refused to entertain the offer of Central.

Central filed for complaints against petitioners praying for the establishment of a legal easement of aqueduct on the parcels of land owned by petitioners and for the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction ex parte to restrain the petitioners from removing and/or destroying the canals or from obstructing the passage of water during the pendency of the litigation.

On June 30, 1970, respondent court ordered the issuance of the writs of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the writs of preliminary injunction must be sustained.

DECISION:

The Court finds no sufficient ground to dissolve the writs of preliminary injunction issued. Central has sufficiently established the necessity of issuing writs of preliminary injunction against petitioners. The writs of preliminary injunction were issued (as correctly averred by Central) not only to protect the existing easement of aqueduct in its favor, but even after the end of 1969-70 crop year, to preserve the status quo between the parties, pending judicial determination as to whether or not Central can convert its contractual easement of aqueduct into a legal easement of aqueduct. If the writs of preliminary injunction were to be dissolved, the probability of the canals' destruction or obstruction by petitioners would be great, considering that they refused the offer made by Central to lease the areas covered by the canals. In the event that respondent court grants Central a legal easement of aqueduct, this judgment might be rendered ineffectual by the destruction or obstruction of the canals.

Case Digest: SPS. Manuel & Victoria Salimbangon vs. SPS. Santos & Erlinda Tan G.R. No. 185240 I January 20, 2010

FACTS:

Guillermo Ceniza died intestate leaving a parcel of land at Poblacion, Mandaue City. Twenty years later his children executed an extrajudicial declaration of heirs and partition, adjudicating and dividing the land among themselves. Lots A, B, and C were adjacent to a city street. But Lots D and E were not, they being interior lots. To give these interior lots access to the street, the heirs established in their extrajudicial partition an easement of right of way consisting of a 3-meter wide alley between Lots D and E that continued on between Lots A and B and on to the street. The partition that embodied this easement of right of way was annotated on the individual titles issued to the heirs.

But, realizing that the partition resulted in an unequal division of the property, the heirs modified their agreement by eliminating the easement of right of way along Lots A, D, and E, and in its place, imposed a 3-meter wide alley, an easement of right of way, that ran exclusively along the southwest boundary of Lot B from Lots D and E to the street.

Petitioner Victoria became the owner of Lot A, one of the three lots adjacent to the city street. Victoria and her husband (the Salimbangons) constructed a residential house on this lot and built two garages on it. One garage abutted the street while the other, located in the interior of Lot A, used the alley or easement of right of way existing on Lot B to get to the street. Victoria had this alley cemented and gated.

Respondent spouses Santos and Erlinda Tan (the Tans) bought Lots B, C, D, and E from all their owners. The Tans built improvements on Lot B that spilled into the easement area. They also closed the gate that the Salimbangons built. Unable to use the old right of way, the Salimbangons lodged a complaint with the City Engineer of Mandaue against the Tans. For their part, the Tans filed an action against the Salimbangons for the extinguishment of the easement on Lot B and damages with application for preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the easement of right of way established by the partition agreement among the heirs has been extinguished.

DECISION:

The easement of right way for the benefit of Lots D and E was extinguished. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that based on the testimony of one of the previous owners, Eduardo Ceniza, the true intent of the parties was to establish that easement of right of way for the benefit of the interior lots, namely, Lots D and E. Consequently, when ownership of Lots B, D, and E was consolidated into the Tans, the easement ceased to have any purpose and became extinct. 

Case Digest: Reyes vs. Sps Francisco Valentin & Anatalia Ramos G.R. No. 194488 I February 11, 2015

FACTS:

Petitioner was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Barangay Malibong Bata, Pandi, Bulacan. The property used to be a portion of Lot No. 3-B8 and was surrounded by estates belonging to other persons. Petitioner also alleged that respondents’ 1,500-square-meter property surrounded her property, and that it was the only adequate outlet from her property to the highway.A 113-square-meter portion of respondents’ property was also the "point least prejudicial to the respondents." The easement sought was the vacant portion near the boundary of respondents’ other lot.

According to petitioner, her and respondents’ lots were previously owned by her mother. Respondents’ lot was given to Dominador Ramos who allegedly was respondents’ predecessor-in-interest. Dominador was also her mother’s brother and caretaker of properties. Only 500 square meters were given to Dominador. Part of the 1,500 square meters was intended as a right of way. Dominador was tasked to prepare the documents. But, instead of limiting the conveyance to himself to 500 square meters of the property, he conveyed the whole 1,500 square meters. Petitioner’s mother presumed that Dominador being her brother would give her a right of way to the main road. Instead of giving way, however, he closed the passage, causing petitioner’s property’s isolation. Despite demands and willingness to pay the amount, respondents refused to accede to petitioner’s claims.

Respondents contended that the isolation of petitioner’s property was due to her mother’s own act of subdividing the property among her children without regard to the pendency of an agrarian case between her and her tenants. The property chosen by petitioner as easement was also the most burdensome for respondents. Respondents pointed to an open space that connected petitioner’s property to another public road.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner has a compulsory easement of right of way over the respondents' property.

DECISION:

The petitioner is not entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way. Petitioner failed to satisfy the Civil Code requirements for the grant of easement rights. Petitioner failed to establish that there was no adequate outlet to the public highway and that the proposed easement was the least prejudicial to respondents’ estate since there is an adequate exit to a public highway. Based on the Ocular Inspection Report, petitioner’s property had another outlet to the highway. In between her property and the highway or road, however, is an irrigation canal, which can be traversed by constructing a bridge, similar to what was done by the owners of the nearby properties. There is, therefore, no need to utilize respondents’ property to serve petitioner’s needs. Another adequate exit exists. Petitioner can use this outlet to access the public roads. The outlet referred to in the Ocular Inspection Report may be longer and more inconvenient to petitioner because she will have to traverse other properties and construct a bridge over the irrigation canal before she can reach the road. However, these reasons will not justify the imposition of an easement on respondents’ property because her convenience is not the gauge in determining whether to impose an easement of right of way over another’s property.

Case Digest: Relova vs. Lavarez G.R. No. L-3623 I November 6, 1907

FACTS:

The plaintiff is the owner of a tract of rice land in the Province of La Laguna, which is cultivated with the aid of water brought from the River Bangcabangca, through an aqueduct which passes over the land of the defendants. On the land of the defendants there was a dam (presa) with a small gate or aperture in its face which was used to control the flow of the water in the aqueduct, by permitting a greater or less quantity to escape in a drainage ditch, also on the land of the defendants. In the month of May, 1905, one of the defendants completely destroyed the dam and let all the water escape by the drainage ditch, so that none flowed on the land of the plaintiff. At the time when the dam was destroyed the plaintiff had some five cavanes of land prepared to plant rice, but because of the escape of the water resulting from the destruction of the dam he was unable to raise his crop, which was a complete failure. The aqueduct and dam in question had been in use by the plaintiff, as of right, for more than thirty years, and that he had an easement in the land of the defendants for the maintenance of the said aqueduct and dam.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a servitude has been established over the aqueduct and the dam.

DECISION:

A servitude exist over the aqueduct and the dam. The Court upheld the existence of easement by virtue of the positive testimony as to the existence of the aqueduct and its use for many years to supply water to the lands in question. The testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses is definite, certain, and positive that a portion of the lands of the plaintiff, watered by the aqueduct, amounting 5 cavanes, was, in fact, prepared by the plaintiff for cultivation in May.

Case Digest: Solid Manila Corp. vs. Bio Hong Trading Co. G.R. No. 90596 I April 8, 1991

FACTS:

The petitioner is the owner of a parcel of land located in Ermita, Manila. The same lies in the vicinity of another parcel, registered in the name of the private respondent corporation. The private respondent's title came from a prior owner, and in their deed of sale, the parties thereto reserved as an easement of way: "...a portion thereof measuring NINE HUNDRED FOURTEEN SQUARE METERS, more or less, had been converted into a private alley for the benefit of neighbouring estates, this being duly annotated at the back of the covering transfer Certificate of title per regulations of the Office of the City Engineer of Manila..."

The petitioner claims that ever since, it had (as well as other residents of neighbouring estates) made use of the above private alley and maintained and contributed to its upkeep, until sometime in 1983, when, and over its protests, the private respondent constructed steel gates that precluded unhampered use.

On the contrary, the private respondent argued that: (1) the easement referred to has been extinguished by merger in the same person of the dominant and servient estates upon the purchase of the property from its former owner; (2) the petitioner has another adequate outlet; (3) the petitioner has not paid any indemnity therefor; and (4) the petitioner has not shown that the right-of-way lies at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not an easement exist on the property; and (2) whether or not the easement had been extinguished by merger.

DECISION:

An easement exist on the property as described in the deed of sale executed between the private respondent and the seller on the private respondent's property, and has been in fact annotated at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title. Hence, albeit the private respondent did acquire ownership over the property –– including the disputed alley –– as a result of the conveyance, it did not acquire the right to close that alley or otherwise put up obstructions thereon and thus prevent the public from using it, because as a servitude, the alley is supposed to be open to the public.

The easement had not been extinguished since there was no merger. According to the Civil Code, a merger exists when ownership of the dominant and servient estates is consolidated in the same person. Merger then, as can be seen, requires full ownership of both estates. Merger presupposes the existence of a prior servient-dominant owner relationship, and the termination of that relation leaves the easement of no use. In this case, the servitude in question is a personal servitude or one constituted not in favor of a particular tenement (a real servitude) but rather, for the benefit of the general public. Unless the owner conveys the property in favor of the public –– if that is possible –– no genuine merger can take place that would terminate a personal easement.

Case Digest: Ronquillo vs. Roco G.R. No. L-10619 I February 28, 1958

FACTS:

The plaintiffs have been in the continuous and uninterrupted use of a road or passageway which traversed the land of the defendants and their predecessors in interest, in going to Igualdad Street and the market place of Naga City, from their residential land and back, for more than 20 year. The defendants and the tenants of Vicente Roco, the predecessors in interest of the said defendants have long recognized and respected the private legal easement of road right of way of said plaintiffs. On May 12, 1953, the defendants Jose Roco thru his co-defendants, Raymundo Martinez and their men with malice aforethought and with a view to obstructing the plaintiffs' private legal easement over the property of the late Vicente Roco, started constructing a chapel in the middle of the said right of way construction actually impeded, obstructed and disturbed the continuous exercise of the rights of the plaintiffs over said right of way. On July 10, 1954 the new defendants Natividad Roco and Gregorio Miras, Jr. with the approval of the defendant, Jose Roco and with the help of their men and laborers, by means of force, intimidation, and threats, illegally and violently planted wooden posts, fenced with barbed wire and closed hermitically the road passageway and their right of way in question against their protests and opposition, thereby preventing them from going to or coming from their homes to Igualdad Street and the public market of the City of Naga.

The plaintiffs claimed to have acquired the easement of right of way over the land of the defendants and the latter's predecessors in interest, Vicente Roco, thru prescription by their continuous and uninterrupted use of a narrow strip of land of the defendants as passageway or road in going to Igualdad Street and the public market of Naga City, from their residential land or houses, and return.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an easement of right of way can be acquired thru prescription.

DECISION:

The easement of right of way may not be acquired through prescription. Under the Civil Code old and new, continuous non-apparent easements and discontinuous ones whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title. Thus, an easement of right of way being discontinuous or intermittent, even though it may be apparent, cannot be acquired through prescription but only by virtue of a title.

Case Digest: Amor vs. Tolentino G.R. No. L-48384 I October 11, 1943

FACTS:

Over 50 years ago, Maria Florentino owned a house and a camarin or warehouse in Vigan, Ilocos Sur. The house had and still has, on the north side, three windows on the upper story, and a fourth one on the ground floor. Through these windows the house receives light and air from the lot where the camarin stands. On September 6, 1885, Maria Florentino made a will, devising the house and the land on which it is situated to Gabriel Florentino, one of the respondents herein, and to Jose Florentino, father of the other respondents. In said will, the testatrix also devised the warehouse and the lot where it is situated to Maria Encarnancion Florentino. Upon the death of the testatrix in 1882, nothing was said or done by the devisees in regard to the windows in question. On July 14, 1911, Maria Encarnacion Florentino sold her lot and the warehouse thereon to the petitioner, Severo Amor, the deed of sale stating that the vendor had inherited the property from her aunt, Maria Florentino. In January, 1938, petitioner destroyed the old warehouse and started to build instead a two-story house. On March 1st of that year, respondents filed an action to prohibit petitioner herein from building higher than the original structure and from executing any work which would shut off the light and air that had for many years been received through the four windows referred to.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an easement of light and view had been established in favor of the property of the plaintiffs thereby prohibiting Amor from constructing a building higher than the original structure.

DECISION:

An easement of light and view had been established in favour of the property of the plaintiffs and Amor is bound by such easement. The Court held that when the original owner, Maria Florentino, died in 1892, the ownership of the house and its lot passed to respondents while the dominion over the camarin and its lot was vested in Maria Encarnancion Florentino, from whom said property was later bought by petitioner. At the time the devisees took possession of their respective portions of the inheritance, neither the respondents nor Maria Encarnacion Florentino said or did anything with respect to the four windows of the respondents' house. The respondents did not renounce the use of the windows, either by stipulation or by actually closing them permanently. On the contrary, they exercised the right of receiving light and air through those windows. Neither did the petitioner's predecessor in interest, Maria Encarnacion Florentino, object to them or demand that they be close. The easement was therefore created from the time of the death of the original owner of both estates, so when petitioner bought the land and the camarin thereon from Maria Encarnancion Florentino, the burden of this easement continued on the real property so acquired because according to Article 534, "easements are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or passively pertain."