Case Digest: Lizares et. al. vs. Hon. Kintanar et. al. G.R. Nos. L-33868-76 I October 18, 1990

FACTS:

Private respondent Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. (Central) is the owner and operator of a sugar mill located in the Municipality of Talisay, Negros Occidental, manufacturing centrifugal sugar from sugarcanes delivered to the mill by petitioners pursuant to Identical milling contracts executed between the former and the latter. Under the provisions of the milling contracts, Central was granted, inter alia, an easement of aqueduct on the parcels of land owned by petitioners for the passage of water from the Imbang River to its sugar mill. For this purpose, Central constructed concrete water canals traversing the parcels of land of petitioners. The easement of aqueduct was for a period of fifty (50) years, which began with 1920-21 crop year up to 1969-70 crop year. Prior to the expiration of this period, Central, by means of separate letters, offered to lease from petitioners the areas occupied by the canals. However, petitioners refused to entertain the offer of Central.

Central filed for complaints against petitioners praying for the establishment of a legal easement of aqueduct on the parcels of land owned by petitioners and for the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction ex parte to restrain the petitioners from removing and/or destroying the canals or from obstructing the passage of water during the pendency of the litigation.

On June 30, 1970, respondent court ordered the issuance of the writs of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the writs of preliminary injunction must be sustained.

DECISION:

The Court finds no sufficient ground to dissolve the writs of preliminary injunction issued. Central has sufficiently established the necessity of issuing writs of preliminary injunction against petitioners. The writs of preliminary injunction were issued (as correctly averred by Central) not only to protect the existing easement of aqueduct in its favor, but even after the end of 1969-70 crop year, to preserve the status quo between the parties, pending judicial determination as to whether or not Central can convert its contractual easement of aqueduct into a legal easement of aqueduct. If the writs of preliminary injunction were to be dissolved, the probability of the canals' destruction or obstruction by petitioners would be great, considering that they refused the offer made by Central to lease the areas covered by the canals. In the event that respondent court grants Central a legal easement of aqueduct, this judgment might be rendered ineffectual by the destruction or obstruction of the canals.