Case Digest: Floro vs. Llenado G.R. No. 75723 I June 2, 1995

FACTS:

Simeon Floro is the owner of a piece of land known as the Floro Park Subdivision. The subdivision has its own egress and ingress to and from the MacArthur Highway by means of its Road Lot 4 and the PNR level crossing.

Orlando A. Llenado, on the other hand, was the registered owner of two (2) parcels of land known as the Llenado Homes Subdivision. Prior to its purchase by Llenado from the owner Francisco de Castro, the land was known as the Emmanuel Homes Subdivision, a duly licensed and registered housing subdivision in the name of Soledad Ortega. Bounded on the South by the 5 to 6 meter-wide Palanas Creek, which separates it from the Floro Park Subdivision, and on the west by ricelands, the Llenado Homes does not have any existing road or passage to the MacArthur Highway. However, a proposed access road traversing the idle riceland has been specifically provided in the subdivision plan of the Emmanuel Homes Subdivision, which was duly approved by the defunct Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (now Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board).

Sometime in February, 1983, the Llenados sought, and were granted, permission by the Floros to use Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park Subdivision as passageway to and from MacArthur Highway. On April 7, 1983, however, Floro barricaded Road Lot 5 with a pile of rocks, wooden posts and adobe stones, thereby preventing its use by the Llenados.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a valid contract of easement of right of way exists when Floro voluntarily allows Llenado passage through his property for a limited time, without compensation; and whether or not Llenado, an owner/developer of a subdivision can demand a compulsory easement of right of way over the existing roads of the adjacent Floro Park subdivision instead of developing his subdivision's proposed access road as provided in his duly approved subdivision plan.

DECISION:

No such contract of easement of right of way was actually perfected between Floro and Llenado. Both Orlando and Wenifreda Llenado testified that the conditions of the easement of right of way were still to be drawn up by Floro's lawyer.

On the second issue, the Llenados cannot demand a compulsory easement of right of way having failed to establish the existence of the prerequisites to validly claim a compulsory right of way since there exist a proposed access road through the Ipapo ricelands. The second requisite has not been met either since Llenado did not include in its prayer the fixing of the amount as indemnity that may be due to Floro in the event that the easement of right of way is constituted. Failing to establish the existence of the prerequisites under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, private respondent Llenado's bid for a compulsory easement of right of way over Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park Subdivision must fail.