Action:
Quo warranto instituted by Tanada the Judge of First Instance of Tayabas, acting in accordance with instructions from the Department of Justice, directed Tanada to cease to act as justice of the peace of Perez, Tayabas for allegedly falling within the scope of Act No. 3899 which requires justice of the peace ages 65 years old to cease to hold office on January 1, 1933.
Facts:
Juan Tañada, the petitioner, was appointed justice of the peace of Alabat, Tayabas, by the Governor-General with the advice and consent of the Philippine Commission on December 4,1911. He continued in that position until September 8, ,1934, when at his own request, "Pursuant to the provisions of section 206 of the Revised Administrative Code", he was "transferred from the position of justice of the peace for the municipality of Alabat, Province of Tayabas, to the same position in the municipality of Perez, same province", by a communication signed by the Governor-General from which the foregoing is quoted, Tanada completed the age of sixty-five years on October 5, 1934.
The applicable law is found in the last proviso to section 203 of the Administrative Code, as inserted by Act No. 3899, and in the proviso to section 206 of the same Code as last amended by Act No. 2768, which read as follows:
"Sec. 203. Appointment and distribution of justices of the peace. * * *. Provided, further, That the present justices and auxiliary justices of the peace who shall, at the time this Act takes effect, have completed sixty-five years of age, shall cease to hold office on January first, nineteen hundred and thirty-three; and the Governor-General, with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate, shall make new appointments to cover the vacancies occurring by operation of this Act."
"SEC. 206. Tenure of office Transfer from one municipality to another. A justice of the peace having the requisite legal qualifications shall hold office during good behavior unless his office be lawfully abolished or merged in the jurisdiction of some other justice: Provided, That in case the public interest requires it, a justice of the peace of one municipality may be transferred to another."
StatCon:
The natural and reasonable meaning of the language used in Act No.3899, leaves room for no other deduction than that a justice of the peace appointed prior to the approval of the Act and who completed sixty-five years of age on September 13, 1934, subsequent to the approval of the Act, which was on November 16, 1931, and to the date fixed for cessation from office which was on January 1, 1933, is not affected by the said Act.
In substantiation of what has just been said, it is of course fundamental that the determination of the legislative intent is the primary consideration. However, it is equally fundamental that that legislative intent must be determined from the language of the statute itself. This principle must be adhered to even though the court be convinced by extraneous circumstances that the Legislature intended to enact something very different from that which it did enact. An obscurity cannot be created to be cleared up by construction and hidden meanings at variance with the language used cannot be sought out. To attempt to do so is a perilous undertaking, and is quite apt to lead to an amendment of a law by judicial construction. To depart from the meaning expressed by the words is to alter the statute, is to legislate not to interpret.
Counsel argued that the language of the proviso in question is somewhat defective and does not clearly convey the legislative intent", and what the Government desired was for the court to insert words and phrases in the law in order to supply an intention for the legislature. . That we cannot do. By liberal construction of statutes, courts from the language used, the subject matter, and the purposes of those framing them are able to find out their true meaning. There is a sharp distinction, however, between construction of this nature and the act of a court in engrafting upon a law something that has been omitted which someone believes ought to have been embraced. The former is liberal construction and is a legitimate exercise of judicial power. The latter is judicial legislation forbidden by the tripartite division of powers among the three departments of government, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial.
Ruling:
Act No. 3899 does not apply to a justice of the peace appointed prior to the approval of the Act who completed sixty-five years of age after January 1, 1933, and that a transfer of a justice of the peace does not amount to an appointment, we reach the conclusion that the special defenses interposed by the Solicitor-General must be overruled. Accordingly, the writ will be granted and the petitioner Juan Tanada will be placed in possession of the office of justice of the peace of Perez, Tayabas.
Quo warranto instituted by Tanada the Judge of First Instance of Tayabas, acting in accordance with instructions from the Department of Justice, directed Tanada to cease to act as justice of the peace of Perez, Tayabas for allegedly falling within the scope of Act No. 3899 which requires justice of the peace ages 65 years old to cease to hold office on January 1, 1933.
Facts:
Juan Tañada, the petitioner, was appointed justice of the peace of Alabat, Tayabas, by the Governor-General with the advice and consent of the Philippine Commission on December 4,1911. He continued in that position until September 8, ,1934, when at his own request, "Pursuant to the provisions of section 206 of the Revised Administrative Code", he was "transferred from the position of justice of the peace for the municipality of Alabat, Province of Tayabas, to the same position in the municipality of Perez, same province", by a communication signed by the Governor-General from which the foregoing is quoted, Tanada completed the age of sixty-five years on October 5, 1934.
The applicable law is found in the last proviso to section 203 of the Administrative Code, as inserted by Act No. 3899, and in the proviso to section 206 of the same Code as last amended by Act No. 2768, which read as follows:
"Sec. 203. Appointment and distribution of justices of the peace. * * *. Provided, further, That the present justices and auxiliary justices of the peace who shall, at the time this Act takes effect, have completed sixty-five years of age, shall cease to hold office on January first, nineteen hundred and thirty-three; and the Governor-General, with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate, shall make new appointments to cover the vacancies occurring by operation of this Act."
"SEC. 206. Tenure of office Transfer from one municipality to another. A justice of the peace having the requisite legal qualifications shall hold office during good behavior unless his office be lawfully abolished or merged in the jurisdiction of some other justice: Provided, That in case the public interest requires it, a justice of the peace of one municipality may be transferred to another."
StatCon:
The natural and reasonable meaning of the language used in Act No.3899, leaves room for no other deduction than that a justice of the peace appointed prior to the approval of the Act and who completed sixty-five years of age on September 13, 1934, subsequent to the approval of the Act, which was on November 16, 1931, and to the date fixed for cessation from office which was on January 1, 1933, is not affected by the said Act.
In substantiation of what has just been said, it is of course fundamental that the determination of the legislative intent is the primary consideration. However, it is equally fundamental that that legislative intent must be determined from the language of the statute itself. This principle must be adhered to even though the court be convinced by extraneous circumstances that the Legislature intended to enact something very different from that which it did enact. An obscurity cannot be created to be cleared up by construction and hidden meanings at variance with the language used cannot be sought out. To attempt to do so is a perilous undertaking, and is quite apt to lead to an amendment of a law by judicial construction. To depart from the meaning expressed by the words is to alter the statute, is to legislate not to interpret.
Counsel argued that the language of the proviso in question is somewhat defective and does not clearly convey the legislative intent", and what the Government desired was for the court to insert words and phrases in the law in order to supply an intention for the legislature. . That we cannot do. By liberal construction of statutes, courts from the language used, the subject matter, and the purposes of those framing them are able to find out their true meaning. There is a sharp distinction, however, between construction of this nature and the act of a court in engrafting upon a law something that has been omitted which someone believes ought to have been embraced. The former is liberal construction and is a legitimate exercise of judicial power. The latter is judicial legislation forbidden by the tripartite division of powers among the three departments of government, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial.
Ruling:
Act No. 3899 does not apply to a justice of the peace appointed prior to the approval of the Act who completed sixty-five years of age after January 1, 1933, and that a transfer of a justice of the peace does not amount to an appointment, we reach the conclusion that the special defenses interposed by the Solicitor-General must be overruled. Accordingly, the writ will be granted and the petitioner Juan Tanada will be placed in possession of the office of justice of the peace of Perez, Tayabas.
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